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appointment to membership will not be based on political patronage.
But on the other hand there may be those who are attracted by power
which may be wielded for their own selfish benefits. Expense accounts
may even be fabricated. To thwart this possibility it has been suggested
that acceptance by an appointee of a position on the board be made man-
datory. With this provision in addition to the provisions already included
in the statutes, the boards ought to be composed of a competent member-
ship. As an added check, the legislatures have also provided for suffi-
ciently long terms and appointments in rotation so that one political
administration can not during any one period exert too much influence
on the board.
A board to be truly advisory must in a great part be free from
restrictions and restraints. If one is controlled in the advice he gives it
is no longer his advice. Therefore an advisory board must function as
its own initiative dictates. For that reason it can not assure an effective
attainment of its objectives, because its success in a great part is depen-
dent on its personnel. The advisory board is no panacea of all admin-
istrative defects but is a valiant attempt to shear the administrative
department of its potential inherent deficiencies.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH
MORTGAGES
PAROLE RELEASE OF AN EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
On March I, x916, Mungeon Cooney delivered to the plaintiff,
Frederick Orth, a mortgage on certain real estate. Cooney died testate
in 1920, leaving all his property to his widow, and appointing her
executrix. In 1927 the widow died intestate leaving her son, Wayne
Cooney, her sole heir. Apparently the condition of defeasance within
the mortgage was broken by the failure to meet interest payments, al-
though such payments were made by Wayne Cooney up to March i,
1931. In 1934 Orth and Wayne Cooney made an oral agreement
whereby the mortgagee was to accept a release of the equity of redemp-
tion in return for the cancellation of the mortgage indebtedness. When
the deed was tendered, Orth refused to accept it and later filed an
application as creditor of Mungeon Cooney for letters of administration
de bonis non of the estate of Mungeon Cooney. This application was
denied in the Probate Court of Hardin County and allowed on error to
the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the Common Pleas Court and affirmed that of the Probate
Court. The Appellate Court held that an executory parol contract is
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sufficient to release the equity of redemption in a mortgage under the
statute of frauds and therefore to extinguish the applicant's claim and
terminate his status as a creditor. Cooney v. Orth, 20 Ohio L. Abs.
570 (1936).
The problem of the validity of an oral release has been dealt with
in two ways. In some instances courts have resorted to the concept of
title, and in others, have applied the doctrine of estoppel.
There are three recognized theories in respect to the general nature
of a mortgagee's interest in the land. By the first, the title theory, legal
title to the mortgaged land is considered to be in the mortgagee upon
execution of the mortgage instrument subject, however, to a condition,
subsequent payment. By the second, the lien theory, no more than a
lien passes to the mortgagee. Legal tide is not vested in him until fore-
closure. By the third theory, an intermediate one, tide is said to pass
upon default of the condition set forth in the mortgage and before fore-
closure. Several text writers have classed Ohio as a "title theory" state.
Jones on Mortgages, (8th Ed.), sec. 51; Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru-
dence (4 th Ed.), sec. 1187; Tiffany on Real Property, sec. 6oo.
Others have placed this state in the intermediate category. Campbell on
Mortgages, p. 24; 27 Ohio Jurisprudence, sec. 135; whereas Charles
White in 3 Cincinnati Law Review 305 (1929) repudiates both classi-
fications and puts Ohio in the lien group. While cases are to be found
supporting both lien and intermediate views, the latter is most frequently
found in the decisions. Kerr v. Lydecker, 51 Ohio St. 240, 37 N.E.
267, 23 L.R.A. 842 (1894); Bradfield v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316, 65
N.E. ioo8 (1902); Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Mahon, 31 Ohio App.
151, 166 N.E. 207 (1929).
Were the three theories of the mortgage capable of being followed
to their logical conclusions, want of a writing would be a defense to an
action brought in a lien state on an oral agreement to release an equity
of redemption. In these jurisdictions legal title remains in the mortgagor
and any attempt to transfer his interest is an attempt to convey a fee
within the statute of frauds. On the other hand this would seem to be
no defense to an action brought in a tide state, for here legal title has
already vested in the mortgagee by the execution of the mortgage. In
the intermediate states the mortgagee has a lien before, but legal title
after default. Thus parol agreements within the intermediate theory,
after condition broken, and the title theory at any time, would not appear
to come within the statute. Nevertheless, the courts have failed to reach
conclusions consistent with these theories. The difficulty arises when it
is seen that the right of the mortgagor to redeem represents an equit-
able interest in land. Where this is recognized, such interest is within
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the statute and therefore, no matter which theory obtains, any executory
parol contract under which the right of redemption is to be released in
return for the cancellation of the mortgage debt is unenforceable. Bor-
cherdt v. Favor, 16 Colo. App. 4o6, 66 Pac. 251 (1901); Smith v.
Burnam, Fed. Cas. No. 130139 (1838); Holmes v. Holmes, 86 N.C.
205 (1882); Marble v. Marble, 5 N.H. 374 (183); Montpelier
Savings Bank v. Follett, 68 Neb. 416 (1903).
In a number of states a broad application has been made of the
doctrine of estoppel to aid in solving the problem, but the cases to which
this may be applied are limited to a comparatively narrow sphere. This
is made up of instances where an absolute deed is given by way of mort-
gage and subsequently the parties thereto orally agree to extinguish both
the debt and the equity of redemption. In these cases a majority of the
courts have indirectly enforced the oral agreement by refusing to declare
the instrument a subsisting mortgage. Kemper v. Campbell, 44 Ohio
St. 21o, 6 N.E. 566 (1886); West v. Reed, 55 III. 242 (1870);
Sears v. Gilman, 199 Mass. 384 (19o8); Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind.
537, 81 N.E. 71 (1907); Green v. Butler, 26 Cal. 595 (1864).
In a portion of these states the courts hold that a parol release of the
equity, accompanied by surrender of the contract of defeasance operates
as a waiver of the right of redemption. The surrender of the legal evi-
dence by which the existence of the mortgage could have been proved,
vests an indefeasible title in the mortgagee on the theory that the mort-
gagor is thereafter estopped from asserting his right. Trull v. Skinner,
17 Pick. (Mass.) 213 (835); Stall v. Jones, 47 Neb. 406, 66
N.V. 653 (1896); Watson v. Edwards, 105 Cal. 70, 38 Pac. 527
(1894); Hutchison v. Page, 246 IIl 71, 92 N.E. 71 (1910).
On the other hand a strong minority, composed largely of lien
states, refuses to uphold any transfer of the equity save by an instrument
in writing. Odell v. Montross, 68 N.Y. 499 (1875); Reich v. Dyer,
91 App. Div. 240, 86 N.Y. Supp. 544 (1904); Howe v. Carpenter,
49 Wis. 697, 6 N.W. 357 (188o); Van Keuren v. McLaughlin, 19
N.J. Equity 187 (1868).
In Ohio Gen. Code 8620 it is provided that "No lease, estate, or
interest either of freehold or of term of years, or any uncertain interest
of, in or out of lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be assigned or
granted except by deed or note in writing signed by the party so granting
it * * *," and in sec. 8621 it is further provided that no action may be
brought on any contract for the sale of lands, or any interest therein
unless such agreement is in writing. The court in the principal case,
relying exclusively upon the authority of Shaw v. Walbridge, 33 Ohio
St. i (1877), failed to see two fundamental factors which distinguished
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that case from the one at bar. In the Shaw case there was an executed
contract, while in the present case it was wholly executory. Furthermore
the suit in that case was instituted by a mortgagor, attempting to assert
a right of redemption after its release pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract, whereas here the mortgagor was endeavoring to extinguish the
mortgage indebtedness by his parol contract so as to deprive the mort-
gagee of his status as a creditor of the estate entitled to letters of ad-
ministration. The effect in the latter case is to force into the mortgagee
an interest in lands.
The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly recognized the distinction
between an executed and executory contract in question involving the
statute of frauds. Although the former has been held enforceable, the
latter has been expressly declared unenforceable as being within the
statute. Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio St. 344, 1i6 N.E. 797, L.R.A.
191 8B ( 1917). Therefore, authority does not sustain an estoppel based
solely on an executory parol contract where neither party has substan-
tially relied, and since application of the concept of locus of title has been
subordinated to the view that the equity of redemption is an interest in
land which cannot be transferred without a writing, it would seem that
the appellate court erred in permitting the morgage debt to be extin-
guished. The practical effect of the decision is to allow a transfer of an
interest in land in contravention of the statute.
ROBIN W. LETT.
NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY WHEN DRIVER OF CAR Is
FOUND GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT
Louis Brinsky, a passenger in a truck owned and operated by Meyer
and Silekovitz, was injured in a collision with a truck owned by the
Fro-Joy Baker-Tabor Ice Cream Company. The Common Pleas Court
of Lake County found Meyer and Silekovitz guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct, thereby taking the case out of the operation of the Guest Act
(Ohio Gen. Code 6308-6) and allowed recovery. Brinsky then filed a
supplemental petition against the defendant, the American Casualty
Company, alleging that Meyer and Silekovitz carried a liability policy
which obligated the defendant to pay the judgment. The policy con-
tained a clause relieving assured from "liability imposed by law upon the
assured, for damages on account of bodily injuries, including death re-
sulting therefrom, accidentally suffered or alleged to have been suffered
by any person. . . ." Held, Defendant insurance company is not liable
